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Elizabeth Frankenberg and Duncan Thomas   ii
ABSTRACT 
There is a longstanding interest in how decisions about resource allocations are 
made within households and how those decisions affect the welfare of household 
members. Much empirical work has approached the problem from the perspective that if 
preferences differ, welfare outcomes will depend on the power of individuals within the 
household to exert their own preferences. Measures of power are therefore a central 
component of quantitative empirical approaches to understanding how differences in 
preferences translate into different welfare outcomes. Following most of the empirical 
studies in this genre, this paper focuses on dynamics within couples, although we 
recognize that dynamics among extended family members and across generations are of 
substantial interest. 
A number of different measures of power have been used in the literature. 
Because control over economic resources is seen as an important source of power, 
individual labor income, which one earns and so presumably controls to some degree, is 
one potential measure of power. However, whether and how much one works is a choice 
that is not likely to be independent of one’s power in the household. Non-labor income 
has also been used as a measure of power, but even if non-labor income does not reflect 
contemporaneous choices, it likely does reflect past choices, particularly labor supply 
choices, and so is also a function of power. Levels of resources brought to the marriage 
by each spouse, over which they may individually retain control, are even less proximate 
to the current choices of household members, but nevertheless reflect one’s taste in   iii 
partners and therefore may not be exogenous to power. (In some instances, resources 
brought to the marriage may reflect decisionmaking by the couple’s parents, depending 
on the role that parents play in arranging marriages or transferring resources at the time 
of marriage.) 
A possible source of insight into the issue is to examine the impact of changes 
that affect the distribution of power within the household but that are plausibly 
exogenous to that power, such as changes in laws related to divorce or changes in benefit 
programs that provide resources to one member of the couple but not the other. Economic 
crises and the dislocations that accompany them may be another source of (exogenous) 
change that provides an opportunity to examine whether changes in the distribution of 
power within households is associated with changes in the welfare of individuals within 
the household.  
Another way to gain insight into intrahousehold decisionmaking is to develop 
additional, more plausibly exogenous, measures of power. In the absence of conducting 
natural experiments, it may be profitable to study variation in community norms or ethnic 
traditions that give rise to different levels of power for different household members. This 
approach has particular appeal for societies with heterogeneous cultures and those 
undergoing dramatic social change. This approach would require combining insights 
from the ethnographic and sociological literatures and from theoretical economic models 
of behavior, as well as knowledge of survey design and field practice. This paper 
describes an attempt to move in the direction of this ambitious agenda.   iv 
Additionally, beyond the development of alternative or additional measures of 
power, it may also be useful to include in household surveys explicit questions to 
multiple household members about decisionmaking within the household. This provides 
insights into differences in perceptions among household members. Additionally, patterns 
of decisionmaking may be outcomes (and thus indicators) of relative power within 
households. Thus, indicators of decisionmaking shed light on how power manifests itself 
in everyday life. 
A goal of this project was to develop and field a decisionmaking module as part 
of a large-scale, multipurpose household survey, the second Indonesia Family Life 
Survey (IFLS2). The IFLS2 was fielded in 13 provinces in Indonesia between August, 
1997, and February, 1998. From the point of view of working in heterogeneous and 
dynamic societies, Indonesia is an ideal laboratory. The IFLS is an ongoing panel survey, 
with the potential to provide a picture of the dynamics of power relationships over time 
and across the life course, an issue about which little is known. 
This paper describes the approach we took to developing the household 
decisionmaking module and presents preliminary results from the IFLS2. We use the 
IFLS2 data to address the following questions: 
 
1)  To what extent are day-to-day patterns of managing resources and making 
decisions consistent with the notion that, within households, members either share 
common preferences or the preferences of one member dominate?   v 
2)  Within households, who has the power over the purse strings? What 
characteristics predict power over the purse strings? 
3)  How do husbands and wives make decisions about expenditures and about use of 
time? Are there particular spheres where the man assumes control, and others 
where the woman dominates? Are certain spheres of decisionmaking more 
typically joint? 
4)  Can we identify indicators of relative power that can be collected in a field setting 
and that can enrich our tests of models of household behavior? Can measures of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The specific context of our research is Indonesia, where we have conducted three 
rounds of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). The IFLS is a multipurpose panel 
survey of over 7,000 households in Indonesia. The first round was conducted in 1993/94. 
The second round was conducted in 1997/98. In the second round, we successfully 
reinterviewed 94 percent of the 7,224 households contacted in IFLS1 (excluding 
households where all members died), along with 800 split-off households. A 25 percent 
subset of the enumeration areas was interviewed again in late 1998. A fourth round of the 
survey was planned for 2000. 
The household survey collected data at the household level (consumption, income 
from household enterprises) and at the individual level on a variety of topics, including 
labor force participation and earnings, non-labor income and assets, migration, education, 
marriage, health status and health care use, and histories of pregnancy and contraceptive 
use. In IFLS2, we conducted physical assessments of health status. In addition to the 
household survey, there was an extensive community and facility survey that included 
interviews with the community leader, the head of the community women’s group, and 
(in 1997/98) an authority in local laws and traditions. 
The overall structure of the IFLS provided the framework within which the 
household decisionmaking module was implemented. The International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) provided support for the development of the module. The 
development proceeded in stages, including a review of ethnographic literature, focus   2
groups with men and women in Jakarta and in nearby rural areas, and pilot-tests and 
pretests of versions of the module.  
 
REVIEW OF THE ETHNOGRAPHIC LITERATURE 
Indonesia is extremely diverse ethnically, which means there are a variety of 
traditions with respect to the organization of family and community life. By reviewing 
the anthropological literature we developed a better understanding of differences among 
ethnic groups. However, the extent to which the groups have been studied and which 
aspects of their social organization have been studied, vary considerably. For example, 
there was much less information available about Kalimantan and the Eastern Islands than 
about Sumatra, Java, and Bali. Because ethnic variation has potentially important 
implications for patterns of intrahousehold decisionmaking in Indonesia, we briefly 
describe some of the main dimensions of diversity among ethnic groups. 
In Indonesia, the term for local traditions is adat, which can be translated as 
customary law, or as the body of tradition that sets out how individuals relate to each 
other with respect to matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, land, and property rights. 
The fact that in Indonesia the colonial system recognized 17 different “adat law areas” is 
testimony to the diversity of systems that exist within the archipelago (Hooker 1978). The 
structure of any adat system is determined by the nature of an individual’s ties to his kin 
and the nature of his ties to a particular area (Ter Haar 1948; Booker 1978). We describe 
some of the principal organizing features of several of the major ethnic groups in 
Indonesia.   3
Java 
Javanese society is renowned for being loosely structured. Large-scale kin groups 
are absent, there are cross-cutting religious, economic, and social groups, marriage ties 
are relatively weak, and mobility is high so that enduring bonds between neighbors are 
not forged (Schweizer 1988). On Java, descent is bilateral and nuclear families are the 
primary unit of social organization. Household members share resources and work 
together to support themselves. Women play a central role in the organization of the 
household economy. There is a common Javanese saying, “women are the minister of the 
interior,” which means that women take the lead in household matters. 
 
Bali 
On Bali, descent is patrilineal and men are viewed as superior to women. A 
household is only committed economically to the maintenance of one ancestral temple, 
that of the man. Nevertheless, after marriage, women continue to retain strong ties to 
their natal homes and to participate in ceremonies there, sometimes accompanied by their 
husbands or children. But at death a woman is cremated by her husband’s family and 
conceptualized as an ancestor by that family. On Bali, only sons can inherit their father’s 
estate. If a man has no son, he can either adopt one or raise the position of one of his 
daughters to that of a son. In this case, when the girl marries, her husband must join her 
family, rather than the reverse. 
   4
The Bugis of South Sulawesi 
Kinship ties are reckoned bilaterally among the Buginese, and at the time of 
marriage, neither bride nor groom loses ties to the natal family. Bride wealth, an integral 
component of a Bugis wedding, measures the social status of the bride and indicates 
much about the status of the groom as well, since marriages tend to be between equals. 
Bride wealth consists of two components: rank-price and spending money. A woman 
may not receive a lower rank-price than her mother, but if her father is higher status than 
her mother, she may receive a higher rank-price than her mother. The amount of rank-
price is determined by adat. The other portion of the bride wealth, called spending 
money, reflects the standing of the bride’s parents. The amounts are often substantial. 
The spending money received by the bride’s family is used for the reception. Spending 
money functions as an aggressive and ostentatious display of status. Rank-price is a 
passive, fixed indicator of the bride’s descent-rank. In South Sulawesi, the children are 
not considered part of the father’s kinship line until the bride price has been paid in full. 
 
The Batak of North Sumatra 
The Batak are patrilineal. Among the Toba Batak, the bride generally moves in 
with the husband’s parents after marriage, but she does not join her husband’s clan. 
Rather, she remains a member of the clan of her birth all her life and merely passes under 
the “jural control” of the lineage of her husband (including his brothers, father, and 
father’s brothers). Both the Toba Batak and the Karo Batak prefer that sons marry the 
daughters of their maternal uncles. Marriages that reverse the family’s marital status   5
relative to another family are avoided. Kinship ties are extremely hierarchical and 
extremely important, and virtually all social interaction occurs within the framework of 
kinship (Kipp 1984).  
  
The Minangkabau of West Sumatra 
The Minangkabau are matrilineal. There is no bride price in Minang culture. 
Although there is an exchange of gifts, the woman is not part of the exchange and gift-
giving is secondary. The husband remains part of his own clan, and children from the 
marriage belong to the clan of the mother. If the mother dies, her children stay with her 
family. Kin group property is very important. Traditionally, it cannot pass to an 
individual, although there is some evidence that this is changing (Kato 1982; Quisumbing 
and Otsuka 2001). Property accrues to the nuclear family only if both the husband and the 
wife participated in acquiring the property.  
 
The groups described above differ considerably in the traditions that form their 
adat. In our empirical work, we will explore whether ethnicity is associated with patterns 
of managing money and control over decisionmaking, as the ethnographic review 
suggests it should be.  
 
FOCUS GROUPS OF MEN AND WOMEN 
The topic of intrahousehold decisionmaking and the relative power of husbands 
and wives is potentially sensitive. Until recently, relatively few household surveys have   6
included questions along these lines, so there is relatively little research to refer to with 
respect to designing a module. Moreover, questions that are interesting and appropriate in 
one setting may have little relevance in another setting. Thus, an important first step in 
designing the decisionmaking module was to listen to Indonesians discuss the topics that 
we were interested in including in the module. We wanted to gauge the sensitivity of the 
topic and listen to the language used in discussions. To meet these goals, we arranged for 
four focus groups to be conducted at two sites: in urban Jakarta and in a rural area outside 
of Jakarta.
1 In each site, one focus-group discussion was conducted with men and one 
with women. Each focus group lasted between one-and-one-half and two hours. The 
topics for discussion were  
 
•  In which areas are disagreements between husbands and wives common with 
respect to how money should be spent, and how are difficulties resolved? Is it 
appropriate for husbands and wives to retain separate pots of money? 
•  Are certain aspects of day-to-day life particularly the concern of women, while 
others are the concern of men, or do men and women share responsibility for 
decisions? 
•  How important are arranged versus unarranged marriages, and what is the role of 
dowry and bride price? 
                                                 
1 Limited funding prevented conducting focus groups in other areas of the country. While the focus groups 
that were conducted cannot capture the ethnic diversity of Indonesia, we felt that they were an important 
first step in establishing the feasibility of the undertaking and in hearing the language used to discuss 
decisionmaking within the household.   7
•  What are some scenarios in which a husband and wife might disagree on 
expenditures, and how should such disagreements be resolved? 
 
The focus groups yielded a number of insights, not least of which was that they 
established the feasibility of asking questions to both men and women about the 
processes of decisionmaking and the respective roles of husbands and wives. Group 
members were willing to talk about these topics and did not appear to feel that they were 
too personal. 
It was also readily apparent that even among focus group participants, there was 
heterogeneity in the workings of the household economy, particularly by age and 
socioeconomic status. Among the urban women, for example, some reported that they 
were equals with their husbands in all decisions, some reported that they typically 
deferred to their husbands, and some said that they made the decisions. The most 
outspoken of the latter group volunteered that she brought home more money than her 
husband. 
Another confirmation from the focus groups was that, consistent with the 
anthropological literature about Javanese families, women play a key role in managing 
the household budget. In a number of households, both men and women expected that the 
man would turn over most or all of his earnings to the wife for her to manage. 
Interestingly, the wife was responsible both for covering current expenses, and for putting 
aside money for emergencies. In these groups it was commonly acknowledged that   8
husbands and wives each had some “private” savings, although this practice seemed to be 
associated with the level of socioeconomic status. For the poorest members of the groups 
in rural areas, private savings appeared less feasible. The results suggested considerable 
variation across couples in patterns of behavior with respect to control over expenditures. 
Among topics that husbands and wives were most likely to disagree about were 
gifts and transfers to family members. With respect to decisions about children’s health 
and education, most respondents seemed to feel that both spouses should play a role and 
that if there were disagreements, it was important to work out compromises. Male 
respondents, particularly in the rural group, mentioned that pressure to earn more so that 
their families could “keep up with the neighbors” was a source of tension in their 
marriage. 
Focus group participants were asked whether the quality of the marriage would be 
affected if one spouse were from a significantly wealthier background than the other. A 
number of participants stated that different levels of socioeconomic status could cause 
problems because one spouse would look down on or try to dominate the other, and that 
it was generally better if husband and wife were from similar backgrounds. Respondents 
reported that very few marriages were arranged by parents. This topic was not fruitful in 
terms of encouraging discussion. 
An observation that was common to all focus groups is that group dynamics 
appeared to play a role in respondents’ answers. Heterogeneity in views was a declining 
function of the time spent in the group. 
   9
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS, PILOTS, AND PRETESTS OF MODULES 
The focus groups provided the basis for designing a structured questionnaire 
module to be administered as part of a pilot test. The module was informed by the focus 
group in a number of ways. First, we included questions about management of the 
household budget in response to the observation that husbands often turn over most of 
their earnings to their wives. Second, we did not include many questions regarding 
whether parents had arranged couples’ marriages. Third, we included a range of different 
behaviors and choices in the questions about decisionmaking. Fourth, we include 
questions on the relative social status of the husband and the wife at the time of marriage. 
All of the questions were asked both to husbands and to wives.  
For the pilot, we tested a longer module than we anticipated fielding. Levels of 
respondent cooperation in the pilot tests was extremely high and provided further 
evidence of the feasibility of administering a structured questionnaire on decisionmaking 
as part of a household survey. 
Many of the questions tested in the pilot were retained in the module that was 
ultimately fielded, and are discussed below. One result from the pilot test of the 
decisionmaking module, and from pilot tests of other modules, was that after about 20 
minutes of questioning on a particular topic, the attention span of respondents had 
wandered far away. 
Another finding that emerged from the pilot test was the importance of designing 
questions so that they are either relevant across a range of life-cycle stages, or so that skip 
patterns filter out respondents for whom questions are not relevant.   10
The point is perhaps best illustrated with an example. We were interested in 
husbands’ and wives’ aspirations for their male and female children, and so a section of 
the module asked about expectations for children’s education, occupation, and age of 
marriage. The questions worked adequately well for respondents with two or three 
children between the ages of five and ten. But they were tedious for anyone with more 
than three children, seemed silly to respondents whose children were very young, and 
were irrelevant for respondents with adult children or no children. We dropped these 
questions from the final version of the module. 
Other questions that were tested but ultimately dropped included questions on 
ownership of “private” assets that one spouse could liquidate, whether a decision to 
liquidate would be discussed with the spouse who did not own the asset, and whom 
respondents talked to about spousal problems. 
The pilot test results taught us the importance of simplicity and specificity. When 
questions required respondents to imagine hypothetical situations that seemed 
implausible or to think at a very abstract level, interviewers spent a lot of time explaining 
the questions or cajoling respondents into answering, frustrating both interviewers and 
respondents. On the other hand, overly specific questions reduced the group of 
respondents for whom the question was relevant to an unacceptably narrow range. 
We confronted this problem by coming up with a list of topics for which we 
wanted to know who in the household made decisions. For example, as respondents 
found the concept of “expensive items” vague, we provided an example that was 
appropriate to the household, which for some households was a cassette player, and for   11
others, a car. In the end, we included the item “large expensive purchases such as a 
refrigerator or TV.” 
A final trade-off that emerged from the pilot test concerned the costs and benefits 
of posing questions symmetrically when day-to-day patterns may be asymmetric. In the 
module that we fielded, respondents are asked identical questions, regardless of their 
gender. This approach guarantees that different patterns of responses by gender are not a 
function of differences in the questions asked. Additionally, respondents were asked both 
about themselves and their spouses. This structure restricted our ability to explore 
phenomenon that are much more common for one gender than the other.  
 
2.  SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
The module that we fielded is provided in the Appendix. While it was 
administered to individuals, its focus is particularly on the dynamics within married 
couples. Because many of the questions concern the relationship between husband and 
wife, the module was only administered to respondents who are currently married and 
whose spouse has lived in the household in the past six months.  
The module comprises three components. The first battery of questions focuses 
specifically on how couples deal with money. Respondents who have a regular source of 
income were queried about their autonomy in spending that money for household 
expenses and about whether they saved a portion over which they retained control.   12
Respondents were asked the same set of questions about their spouse, if their spouse had 
a regular source of income. 
One of the drawbacks of these questions is that they are only relevant when at 
least one member of the couple has a source of income. Although most men reported a 
source of income, less than half of the female respondents did. An additional set of 
questions were asked to all respondents about whether their arrangements with their 
spouse were such that if the respondent needed money when the spouse was absent, he or 
she could comfortably use money from the spouse’s wallet or purse. The converse of 
these questions were asked as well. That is, if the respondent was away and his or her 
spouse needed money, was it acceptable for the spouse to use money from the 
respondent’s wallet or purse. The point of these questions was to discuss whether couples 
pool resources to the extent that there is complete transparency in terms of who has 
resources at a given time. 
In combination, these questions provided insights into the notion of income 
pooling. Specifically, they touch on the degree of autonomy of each member of the 
couple with respect to expenditures and savings, and on the degree of privacy that 
characterizes attitudes toward cash in the home. 
The second battery of questions concerns how families make decisions about 
expenditures and use of time. Each respondent was asked who in the household makes 
decisions about expenditures or use of time for each of 17 items, including food eaten at 
home, clothing (respondent’s, spouse’s, and children’s), resources allocated to child 
education and health, gifts to family members, savings, expenditures on durables, time   13
spent socializing (respondent and spouse), and use of contraception. Respondents are 
allowed to name multiple decisionmakers. Recognizing that household and family 
structures are varied, we allowed respondents to report that decisions were made by 
coresident, non-coresident family, and nonfamily members. As shown among our 
respondents below, the vast majority of decisions are made by the husband and wife. 
These questions were designed to explore whether, within the household, 
husbands and wives make decisions jointly (either as a couple or in conjunction with 
other family members), or whether certain members dominate decisionmaking in 
particular arenas.
2  
The last battery of questions in the module attempts to provide insight into the 
relative status of husbands and wives within the household. These questions focus on the 
family backgrounds of husbands and wives at the time of marriage. Each respondent was 
asked to evaluate the relative position of his or her parents in relation to his or her 
spouse’s parents at the time that the respondent married the spouse. There are eight 
categories on which the comparisons are made, including the father’s job and education, 
the mother’s education, the family’s position in the community and quality of housing, 
and levels of earnings and assets. We collected this information because parts of 
Indonesia, e.g., Java, are extremely hierarchical; thus, beyond whatever effect the 
                                                 
2 The questions themselves do not ask respondents whether decisions are made jointly with their spouse. 
Rather, the questions allow husbands and wives to identify all the participants in a decision. If a respondent 
identifies both him or herself and his or her spouse as participants in a decision, then we infer that from the 
respondent’s perspective, the decision is made jointly with the spouse. This interpretation is also suggested 
by the focus groups, during which husbands and wives alike stated repeatedly the importance of deciding 
things together and compromising in the event of conflict.   14
absolute socioeconomic level of the respondent’s family, the relative position of the 
 and wife’s families may well influence their respective levels of power within 
the marriage. Another reason we collected these measures is that in the focus groups, 
respondents stressed that marriage between people from different socioeconomic 
backgrounds were likely to result in serious discordance. 
Because the questions were asked not just of the respondent, but also about the 
respondent’s spouse, it was possible to consider the answers from multiple perspectives: 
how individuals perceived their own situation, how they perceive their spouse’s situation, 
and whether the perceptions of each member of the couple corresponded to those of the 
spouse. 
Finally, the question of how to interview husbands and wives separately needs to 
be addressed. All interviews were conducted individually and interviewers were trained 
to try to interview each spouse alone. That was not always possible and the interviewers 
were told to not risk an interview being disrupted or stopped if the spouse wanted to be 
present. For about a third of the couples, neither spouse was at either interview; for 
another third, interviews were conducted with the spouse present at both interviews. In 
many of the latter cases, the interviews were conducted simultaneously in different parts 
of the room with the male interviewer interviewing the male respondent and the female 
interviewer interviewing the female respondent. It would be naïve to think that the 
interviews with each member of the couple are independent and getting independent 
responses is not practical in a field setting. (Even if the interviews are conducted without 
the spouse present, they would have to be conducted simultaneously. That is very hard to   15
accomplish among respondents who work. Imposing that restriction would have seriously 
reduced the interview completion rates in the IFLS.) 
 
3.  RESULTS 
Results presented here are primarily from the household decisionmaking module. 
This module was administered to household residents who were married at the time of the 
interview, and whose spouse had lived in the household within the past six months. There 
were 5,186 couples that received the module. We investigated the correlates of two types 
of behavior: income sharing/pooling and decisionmaking within the household. Both of 
these types of behavior are potentially associated with measures of the husband’s and 
wife’s relative power in the household. 
 
INCOME SHARING AND INCOME POOLING 
One purpose of the module was to collect data on the extent to which individual 
household members pool their resources and treat resources as part of a common pot. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on responses to questions related to this topic. 
About 20 percent of females who earned income reported that they set aside a portion of 
that income, which they could spend without consulting their spouse. The corresponding 
proportion for males was lower, at 16.3 percent.
3 Much higher proportions of both 
women and men reported that they felt free to spend their income on household expenses: 
                                                 
3 These questions are asked only of respondents who have a source of income. There were 2,310 female 
respondents who reported earning income and 4,855 male respondents who reported earning income.   16
53.3 and 43.3 percent, respectively. These results certainly suggest that there are 
households in which husbands and wives do not pool all their income. An additional 
question was asked of all respondents, regardless of whether they had income, about 
whether, if they needed money and their spouse was not at home, they would feel 
comfortable using money from their spouse’s wallet or purse. This question also 
addresses the issue of whether couples perceive that there is a “common pot” from which 
they may both draw. Less than 20 percent of respondents reported that they would feel 
comfortable using money from their spouse’s purse if he or she was absent. 
Besides the simple distributions reported above, there were patterns that 
characterized couples rather than individuals. The joint distributions of the questions are 
also presented in Table 1. Most couples live in households where neither kept money to 
him/herself (66.9 percent). Females were a little more likely than males to keep part of 
their income. In only about 8 percent of couples did both keep some of their income. The 
pattern is quite similar with respect to whether respondents felt comfortable using their 
spouse’s money. A different pattern emerged with respect to couples’ arrangements about 
expenditures. With respect to freedom to spend, there were almost as many couples in 
which only the female reported that she was free to spend as there were in which both 
couples were free to spend. It was rare that only the husband felt free to spend his income 
on household goods. 
Table 1 shows evidence that there were couples who do not pool their incomes, or 
more generally, who treat money as though it was all part of a common pot. What factors   17
predicted men’s and women’s behaviors with respect to managing money? Table 2 
provides coefficients from probit regressions of the behaviors discussed above.  
There are several classes of covariates that are included in the models. We include 
measures of the ethnicity of the respondent. Respondents were assigned to six groups. 
The groups are the Javanese, the Minangkabau, the Balinese, other Sumatran (those who 
speak Sumatran languages other than Minang), and “outer islands” (including ethnic 
groups in Kalimantan, West Nusa Tengarra, and South Sulawesi). We also create a 
residual category for speakers of Chinese and residents of Jakarta and West Java who 
speak Indonesian or who speak languages other than Javanese, Balinese, Minang, or a 
Sumatran language. 
We also include an indicator for whether the respondent lives in an urban area. 
Several variables are conceptualized as measures of power. These include age of 
both the husband and wife, years of education for both the husband and wife, and 
whether the head of the household is male. We also include the husband’s perception of 
whether his family was of higher status that his wife’s, based on the families’ relative 
positions in the community at the time of marriage. An indicator of the wife’s perception 
of whether her husband’s family had higher status that hers (at the time of marriage) is 
included as well. 
Finally, four variables capture the dynamics of the interview: whether the husband 
was interviewed alone and whether his wife was present, and whether the wife was 
interviewed alone and whether her husband was present.   18
The first two columns of Table 2 show results for whether females and males set 
aside money from their income, over which they retain control.  
As described above, the reference group for ethnicity is one we called 
“other/urban,” which consists of Chinese speakers and speakers of Indonesian or other 
languages who reside in Jakarta or West Java. These respondents tended to be from urban 
areas and were, on average, more “modern” than other respondents. Javanese, Sumatran, 
and (particularly) Minangkabau women were significantly less likely to report keeping 
money than the reference group. Balinese women and women from the outer islands 
(West Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan) were indistinguishable from the 
reference group. The results for men were not very different, although the coefficients 
were somewhat smaller in magnitude. Urban residence increased the chance that women 
and that men retained part of their income. These results are consistent with the focus 
groups, which suggested that retaining private savings was more common among better-
off urban residents. 
Increasing levels of education for both the woman and her husband increased the 
chance that she reported keeping part of her income, but only the man’s education 
affected the chance that he kept some of his income. As the age of her husband rose, a 
woman was less likely to keep part of her income, while her age was positively related to 
the chance that she retained some of her income. Older men were less likely than younger 
men to reserve some of their income. 
The perceptions of the husband with respect to his family’s economic status were 
not associated with whether his wife kept part of her income, but when she perceived that   19
his family was of higher status than hers, she was less likely to report retaining some of 
her income. Her perceptions were also a significant predictor of whether he kept income. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 2 report the results for whether men and 
women felt free to spend their income on household items. Both Javanese and Balinese 
women were much less likely than women in the “other/urban” category to report that 
they felt free to spend their income on household goods, while Sumatran women and 
women on other outer islands were more likely to report feeling free. The relationship 
between ethnicity and freedom to spend money differed for men. Except for the Balinese, 
all other ethnic groups of men were more likely than their “other/urban” counterparts to 
feel free to spend their money. 
Neither the wife’s nor her husband’s education affected either’s feelings of 
freedom with respect to expenditures. Rising age of the wife, however, had a deterrent 
effect on men feeling free to spend money. 
As with whether women keep money, when women perceived their husbands as 
from higher status backgrounds, they felt less freedom to spend money.  
The fifth and sixth columns of Table 2 report whether women and men felt 
comfortable taking money from their spouse’s wallet or purse if they need money and 
their spouse is absent. 
There were no differences between the reference category and Javanese and 
Sumatran men and women. Minangkabau women and men, however, were much less 
likely to feel comfortable using their spouse’s money. Balinese women and “outer island” 
men, however, were much more likely to feel comfortable using their spouse’s money.    20
Years of education (either own or spouse’s) were not related to whether 
respondents felt comfortable taking money, but women were less likely to feel 
comfortable when their husbands were older, and when they perceived that their 
husbands were from higher status backgrounds. 
All of the dependent variables in this table measured perceptions related to 
income-sharing and income-pooling. It is clear from the results that perceptions varied 
significantly by ethnicity, as the ethnographic literature suggested it would, and by 
characteristics of husbands and wives that were related to their status in the household. 
None of the interview dynamic variables affected whether men or women 
reported retaining income, but several of the interview dynamic variables do affect 
reports about freedom to spend money and about degree of comfort in using money. It is 
important to point out that the interview variables were not necessary distributed 
randomly across households. It is possible that interview dynamics are correlated with 
power in the household. Moreover, the relationship between the reported behaviors and 
characteristics of the interviews may reflect more than simply an effect of interview 
dynamics on the propensity to report certain things. Note that whether a woman’s spouse 
is present at her interview is related not only to her report that she feels free to spend 
money, but also to her husband’s report. If the presence of a spouse is related only to 
reporting propensity, then there should be no effect of dynamics of the woman’s 
interview on the male’s reports of behavior. 
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SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND POWER 
The literature has discussed in detail the different roles that men and women play 
in the household as well as in the broader economy. The implications of these "spheres of 
interest" for models of household behavior have been drawn out in, for example, 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993). In an effort to pry open the "black box" of the household, 
each respondent was asked to describe who he or she perceived was the primary 
decisionmaker for a series of different household activities. For example, say it has been 
argued (in a particular context) that women who have more control over resources 
allocate more to food expenditures and that a reduced form regression shows that food 
shares are higher as women have more "power." It should be the case that women have 
more say in budget allocations (to food) in those households in which they have more 
power. Our goal is to assess whether this is true. 
Table 3 provides the joint distribution of decisionmaking regarding expenditures 
on food at home as reported by husbands and their wives.  
Comparing the marginal distributions, one is immediately struck by the similarity 
of the distributions, which might lead one to conclude that there is a very high degree of 
concordance in the reports of husbands and their wives. Inspection of the joint 
distribution demonstrates that this conclusion would be premature. In fact, fully 25 
percent of the couples did not report the same decisionmaker(s). While we do not analyze   22
them here, these discrepancies may provide insights into the extent of conflict in power-
relations within the households.
4 
These results are presented again in the first line of Table 4. The first panel 
displays the male's report; female reports are in the second panel. The percentage of 
couples that report the same decisionmaker(s) is the third panel and the diagonal elements 
of Table 3 (the distribution of the "consistent" cases) is reported in the final panel. For 
example, both husband and wife reported that the wife makes decisions about food in 65 
percent of cases. 
The most striking result in Table 4 is the heterogeneity in decisionmaking among 
respondents. While managing household expenses (on food and routine items) is largely 
the wife's domain, in around 20 percent of households, the husband either takes charge or 
plays a role in the decision. At the other extreme, the decision to use contraceptives is 
largely a joint decision—over three-quarters of respondents report making the decision in 
collaboration with their spouse. And, if the decision is not joint, it is usually a woman's 
choice. Between these extremes, there is a spectrum of distribution of decisionmakers. 
For example, whereas the man plays little role in decisions about his wife's or children’s 
clothing, the reverse is not true when it comes to his own clothes: his wife is a 
decisionmaker in about one-third of households. Time spent working is primarily a joint 
decision, but time spent socializing is an individual's choice in almost half the 
households. While routine expenditures, gifts, and spending on arisan are all a woman's 
                                                 
4 It should be noted, however, that discordance does not necessarily indicate conflict—it may be that two 
individuals simply have different perceptions as to who makes decisions about certain topics.   23
domain, larger expenditure and savings decisions are less so. Males play a particularly 
key role in decisions about expenditures on durables. 
Family structures in Indonesia are very complex: there are a substantial number of 
multigenerational households as well as many extended households. Yet, very few 
couples report that they do not play a primary role in decisions in the domains that we 
asked about. The exceptions are investments in children (particularly clothing) as well as 
durable expenditures (which are likely to involve investments by other family members, 
some of whom may not be co-resident). 
Table 4 shows that many households do appear to behave as if there are spheres 
of influence that differ for men and women. That tells us nothing about whether the 
unitary model of the household is appropriate, for it may be efficient for couples to invest 
in different spheres. If, however, measures of power do affect the choice of 
decisionmaker, then we would need to turn to more complex models of the household to 
understand behavior. 
We address this question in Tables 5a-5e, which present regressions of the 
determinants of who is reported to be the prime decisionmaker for five spheres of 
interest: expenditures on food, expenditures on child education, provision of health care 
for children, durable purchases, and the decision to use contraceptives. 
In each case, multinomial logit regression estimates are displayed for the male's 
reports (in the first panel) and the female's reports (in the second panel). In each panel, 
the first two columns record the impact of the covariate on the probability that the 
decision is individualistic relative to the decision being joint. The difference between the   24
two columns, that is, the impact on the probability on the wife making the decision, 
relative to the husband, is in the third column. We leave for future work analysis of the 
differences between male and female reports and focus here on the main results in the 
tables. 
The first set of covariates is a set of ethnicity indicator variables. These controls 
are not only of interest by themselves, but they also provide some cross-validation of the 
survey responses with anthropological evidence. For all decisions except use of 
contraceptives, the excluded group (modern or nontraditional groups) was the most likely 
to be individualistic in their decisionmaking.  
Among the Balinese, it is common to make decisions jointly. Relative to women 
of other ethnicities, however, Balinese women stand out as being particularly unlikely to 
report that they make decisions on their own, regardless of what the decision is. Balinese 
men, on the other hand, do not stand out as being particularly unlikely to report that they 
make decisions on their own. Thus, among the Balinese, the pattern of reporting differs 
by gender. For couples that are Sumatran but not Minang, husbands and wives tend to 
agree that women do not decide on their own about expenditures on food and durables. 
Thus, for the two groups that are patrilineal, it is particularly unlikely to observe that 
women report themselves as making decisions on their own. 
The matrilineal Minang are a group for whom both males and females report that 
joint decisionmaking is common. But males are more likely than females to report that 
females do not make decisions on their own, particularly with respect to expenditures on 
food and education. The one behavior for which Minang men and women agree that   25
decisionmaking is not joint (and is in the hands of women) is contraceptive use. 
Additionally, Minangkabau women (and women from other parts of Sumatra) are no 
different from “nontraditional women” in the probability of reporting that they make 
these decisions alone. With respect to contraceptive decisionmaking among other groups, 
if the decision is not made jointly, then it is more likely to be in the woman’s domain 
among the Balinese and Javanese. 
The Javanese are more likely to make decisions jointly than is the reference 
category, but they are not as likely to make decisions jointly as the Balinese and 
Minangkabau. Among the Javanese, both men and women report that decisions are made 
jointly. Large differences in reporting patterns by gender do not emerge. 
The age and education of both husband and wife are included in the second set of 
covariates. Controlling for husband education, the wife's education can be interpreted as 
relative education (or a measure of relative power). Most men are better educated than 
their wives: holding his education constant, an increase in his education implies a 
reduction in the gap. For example, in Table 5a according to the wives' reports, an increase 
in her own education reduces the probability her husband will make decisions about food 
expenditures, relative to the decision being joint (first column of second panel), and will 
increase the probability she makes the decisions relative to him making them (third 
column of second panel). This pattern holds for all decisions—expenditures on child 
education, child health, durables, and perhaps, for contraceptive use—but for one 
anomalous result: as the wife's education increases, she is more likely to make decisions 
about child health jointly with her husband.   26
A key strength of the IFLS is the array of indicators of power that are collected. 
These include income, individual non-labor income, and assets as well as assets at 
marriage, all of which were collected in IFLS1 and were repeated in IFLS2. These have 
been (and will be) exploited elsewhere (see, for example, Thomas, Contreras, and 
Frankenberg 1996; Beegle, Frankenberg, and Thomas 1998). We focus here on a set of 
indicators that are new in IFLS2. 
A legitimate concern with collecting retrospective information on assets brought 
to marriage is measurement error. The error may take several forms. Apart from random 
error, there may be a tendency for a respondent to either hide resources or inflate their 
status. Moreover, there is likely to be recall bias in both values and the date of marriage. 
Finally, it is difficult for respondents to report the real value of the assets in current 
rupiah but, as time since marriage increases, there may be a tendency to inflate the value 
because it seems low now. This seriously complicates use of the measure. Furthermore, 
one's relative position in a marriage may not only be a function of the physical assets 
brought to the marriage but also the support one may rely on from outside the marriage. 
With these issues in mind, each respondent was asked to rate his or her 
background at the time of marriage relative to his or her spouse on a five point scale 
(1 = much higher, 2 = somewhat higher, 3 = about the same, 4 = somewhat lower, 
5 = much lower). Status was defined over several different domains (father's job, father's 
education, mother's education, family assets, etc.); we use the most general: the status of 
the family relative to that of the spouse. The regressions include an indicator for those 
men who reported their families were of higher status and an indicator for those women   27
who reported their husbands were from a higher status family. Both indicators should, 
therefore, identify more powerful men in the household. 
Men from higher status families were more likely to make decisions about the 
health of their children, expenditures on the education of their children, on durable 
expenditures, and on the couples' decision to use contraceptives. This evidence is 
suggestive that these measures of power are capturing something important in households 
and that they do affect decisionmaking.  
There are, however, two anomalous results. Women who reported themselves as 
being married to higher status men were more likely to also report that they made 
decisions about child health. Recall that a counter-intuitive pattern also emerged for 
education: better educated women were less likely to be making decisions about child 
health alone. This suggests that better educated women and those married to higher status 
husbands are inclined to make child health care decisions jointly with their husbands. 
Women married to higher status men are more likely to make contraception decisions 
alone. 
On balance, the results for this first set of measures of power within the household 
are not conclusive. At the very least, they do indicate that there are subtleties across 
households in how decisions are made, and they do provide some suggestions of how to 
model these differences. 
The final set of covariates refers to the conditions of the interview and, in 
particular, whether the interview was conducted with the spouse present or alone (the 
excluded category being interviews with other people present). There is some evidence   28
that these controls do affect the answers given by respondents. At a superficial level, the 
controls should have no effect on behavior within the household and thus only reflect 
reporting error. That, however, presumes the allocation of respondents to each interview 
type is random—which is not the case, since it is a choice of the respondent—and that 
there is no communication about the survey among the respondents after the interviewer 
has gone—which is unlikely to be true. Moreover, if the controls capture only interview 
conditions, the presence of the respondent at the spouse's interview should have no effect 
on one's own answer. That hypothesis is clearly rejected with these data. These results 
suggest that collecting information about couples in household surveys on an individual 
basis may prove to be quite difficult in practice. 
In addition to the tests of significance reported in the tables, we have tested for the 
joint significance of variables included in our various categories of predictors (Table 6). 
Taking covariates in groups, ethnicity is a powerful predictor of decisionmaking. It is 
significant in all the regressions. Social status indicators of the husband and wife are 
jointly significant in the domains of food, durables, and contraception; education of the 
respondents is significant in the child education, child health, and durables domains. In 
view of the importance of ethnic differences, we have also explored interactions between 
ethnicity and the relative status of the husband and wife; no clear patterns emerge, with 
few of the interactions being significant. 
It is possible that whether a respondent was interviewed alone is a function of 
their own social status relative to that of their spouse. This would potentially contaminate   29
our tests. We have, therefore, tested this hypothesis and find that the interview conditions 
are unrelated to the social status indicators. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has demonstrated that a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to studying the dynamics of power in the household can enrich our 
understanding of intrahousehold decisionmaking. Moreover, the paper demonstrates the 
feasibility of including in household surveys explicit questions on the management of 
household finances and on patterns of decisionmaking. Administering these questions 
both to husbands and wives provides a richer set of information than asking them of only 
one partner, although, in practice, it is difficult to completely isolate the spouses from one 
another during the interviews. 
In this paper, we have focused on a nonfinancial measure of power: the relative 
status of families of husbands and wives at the time of marriage. This measure does affect 
couples’ financial arrangements and patterns of decisionmaking, which suggests the 
potential value of developing additional, non-economic measures of power within the 
household. 
The topic of power in the household, how to measure it, and how to capture its 
effects on decisionmaking, resource allocation, and outcomes, is complex. If the models 
of household behavior that theorists put forth are to be tested empirically, it is imperative   30
that surveys make increasingly sophisticated efforts to collect data that will be up to the 
task.   31
TABLES 
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Table 1—Perceptions of income sharing and income-pooling 
  Percent that answer yes to questions 
  Females    Males 
    Joint distribution   
       
1. Apart from money you use for household expenses, is there 
any part of your income that you set aside that you can spend 
without consulting your spouse? 
     
       
  All respondents    21.2      16.3 
    (0.8)      (0.5) 
       
  Couples (both spouses asked)    21.7      19.2 
    of whom  Both      7.8   
      Female only      13.9   
      Male only      11.4   
      Neither      66.9   
       
2. Are you free to spend the money you earn on household 
expenses? 
     
       
  All respondents    53.3      43.3 
    (1.0)      (0.7) 
       
  Couples (both spouses asked)    53.1      43.0 
    of whom  Both      27.5   
      Female only      25.6   
      Male only      15.5   
      Neither      31.4   
       
3. If you needed money and your spouse was not at home, 
would you feel comfortable taking money from your spouse's 
wallet/purse? 
     
       
  Couples    17.6      18.6 
    (0.5)      (0.5) 
       
    of whom  Both      6.8   
      Female only      10.8   
      Male only      11.8   
      Neither      70.6   
Notes: The first two questions are asked only of respondents who earn income. The third question is asked 
of all respondents. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 2—Perceptions of income-sharing and income-pooling Probit regression 
estimates 
   
Keeps own money 
   
Free to spend money 
  Comfortable taking 
money 
Covariates  Female  Male    Female  Male    Female  Male 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
Ethnicity: (1) if Javanese    -0.293*    -0.202*      -0.224*    0.158*      0.017    -0.074 
    (2.60)    (2.75)      (2.10)    (2.36)      (0.23)    (1.05) 
  Sumatran    -0.357*    -0.344*      0.257+    0.498*      -0.003    -0.015 
    (2.33)    (3.31)      (1.80)    (5.64)      (0.04)    (0.17) 
  Minangkabau    -0.654*    -0.533*      -0.002    0.286*      -0.419*   -0.850* 
    (3.63)    (3.82)      (0.02)    (2.67)      (2.98)    (5.28) 
  Balinese    -0.056    0.160      -0.413*    -0.094      0.213+   -0.111 
    (0.38)    (1.44)      (2.97)    (0.93)      (1.93)    (0.99) 
  Outer Isl    -0.205    0.031      0.285*    0.274*      0.105    0.150+ 
    (1.54)    (0.35)      (2.26)    (3.49)      (1.20)    (1.80) 
(1) urban household    0.167*    0.219*      -0.048    -0.163*      -0.116*   -0.063 
    (2.53)    (4.48)      (0.84)    (4.02)      (2.51)    (1.38) 
Years of education                 
  Male    0.025*    0.044*      0.008    0.000      0.008    0.004 
    (2.46)    (5.76)      (0.85)    (0.06)      (1.06)    (0.54) 
  Female    0.030*    -0.002      -0.008    -0.010      -0.009    0.000 
    (2.68)    (0.41)      (0.94)    (1.63)      (1.34)    (0.03) 
Age                 
  Male    -0.012*    -0.007+      0.000    0.001      0.007+   0.004 
    (2.25)    (1.95)      (0.02)    (0.17)      (1.90)    (1.03) 
  Female    0.014*    0.002      0.001    -0.009*      -0.004    -0.002 
    (2.24)    (0.50)      (0.14)    (2.75)      (1.31)    (0.87) 
(1) male is head    0.048    0.023      -0.055    0.168*      0.137+   0.020 
    (0.44)    (0.33)      (0.58)    (2.71)      (1.91)    (0.30) 
(1) if male's family higher social status                 
  According to male    0.068    0.075      -0.113    -0.046      0.018    0.100+ 
    (0.79)    (1.23)      (1.46)    (0.89)      (0.29)    (1.73) 
  According to female    -0.227*    -0.168*      -0.163*    -0.037      -0.112+   0.015 
    (2.61)    (2.55)      (1.99)    (0.66)      (1.72)    (0.23) 
Interview characteristics                 
  (1) spouse at male interview    0.102    0.033      0.008    0.110*      0.021    0.076 
    (1.25)    (0.56)      (0.12)    (2.27)      (0.38)    (1.40) 
  (1) male interview alone    -0.002    -0.059      0.090    0.026      0.044    0.008 
    (0.03)    (0.86)      (1.12)    (0.45)      (0.67)    (0.12) 
  (1) spouse at female interview    -0.096    -0.029      0.152*    0.137*      0.139*   0.057 
    (1.30)    (0.58)      (2.34)    (3.15)      (2.79)    (1.18) 
  (1) female interviewed alonel    0.056    -0.066      0.137+    0.108*      0.102+   -0.015 
    (0.67)    (1.05)      (1.84)    (2.05)      (1.69)    (0.27) 
Intercept    -0.844*    -0.825*      0.265    -0.130      -1.140*   -0.983* 
    (3.84)    (5.65)      (1.34)    (1.04)      (7.92)    (7.08) 
                 
Likelihood   -1,127.768   -2,052.686    -1,556.902  -3,250.464   -2,350.710  -2,439.508 
Chi square    139.710    210.610     79.550   141.970    66.440   76.290 
Notes: Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. 5,186 couples are included in sample. 2,310 female and 4,855 male 
respondents who report having their own income are included in columns 1-4; all respondents are included in 
columns 5 and 6. 
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Table 3—Spheres of control: Distribution of reported decisionmaker regarding 
expenditures on food at home, by couples 
  Comparing consistency of male and female reports of expenditures on food at 
home 
 
     
Female reports decisionmaker is 
    Male  Female  Joint  Other  Marginal 
             
    1.2    4.1    0.7    0.1    6.1 
Male    20.4    67.4    11.3    0.9   
    20.2    5.3    5.0    1.7   
           
    4.3    65.3    6.4    1.1    77.0 
Female    5.6    84.8    8.2    1.4   
    70.4    84.8    46.4    33.1   
           
    0.6    7.3    6.6    0.2    14.6 
Joint    3.8    50.0    45.1    1.1   
    9.0    9.5    48.1    5.0   
           
    0.0    0.3    0.1    1.9    2.4 
Other    1.1    14.4    3.3    81.1   
    0.4    0.4    0.6    60.3   








































    6.1    77.0    13.7    3.2    100.0 
Notes: 3,798 couples. First element of each panel is joint density (bold), second is row marginal (italics), 
third is column marginal. 
 
  
Table 4—Spheres of control: Distribution of reported decisionmaker within couples 
  Male’s report    Female’s report        Both report 
Decisionmaker is    Male  Female Joint  Other    Male  Female Joint  Other   Consistent   Male  Female Joint 
                               
Food at home  6.1  77.0  14.6  2.4    6.1  77.0  13.7  3.2    75.0    1.2  65.3  6.6 
  (0.4)  (0.7)  (0.6)  (0.2)    (0.4)  (0.7)  (0.6)  (0.3)    (0.7)    (0.2)  (0.8)  (0.4) 
Routine household purchases  5.8  77.2  14.4  2.6    6.2  74.7  15.4  3.8    73.2    1.1  63.4  6.9 
  (0.4)  (0.7)  (0.6)  (0.3)    (0.4)  (0.7)  (0.6)  (0.3)    (0.7)    (0.2)  (0.8)  (0.4) 
Male’s clothes  30.8  29.2  36.5  3.6    26.8  30.6  38.8  3.8    52.9    13.7  14.5  22.7 
  (0.7)  (0.7)  (0.8)  (0.3)    (0.7)  (0.7)  (0.8)  (0.3)    (0.8)    (0.6)  (0.6)  (0.7) 
Female’s clothes  9.5  53.5  34.2  2.8    10.8  53.1  32.3  3.8    57.9    2.0  35.2  19.0 
  (0.5)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.3)    (0.5)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.3)    (0.8)    (0.2)  (0.8)  (0.6) 
Children’s clothes  7.6  34.5  45.7  12.2    7.3  33.0  46.0  13.7    60.6    2.1  19.2  30.2 
  (0.4)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.5)    (0.4)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.6)    (0.8)    (0.2)  (0.7)  (0.8) 
Child education  14.0  12.9  67.3  5.7    10.8  14.1  68.4  6.7    67.5    4.5  5.2  53.2 
  (0.6)  (0.6)  (0.8)  (0.4)    (0.5)  (0.6)  (0.8)  (0.4)    (0.8)    (0.3)  (0.4)  (0.8) 
Child health  10.4  15.1  69.9  4.5    7.1  17.3  70.4  5.2    69.7    2.8  6.5  56.8 
  (0.5)  (0.6)  (0.8)  (0.3)    (0.4)  (0.6)  (0.8)  (0.4)    (0.8)    (0.3)  (0.4)  (0.8) 
Expenditure on durables  18.8  6.8  65.3  9.1    18.0  7.2  64.5  10.2    66.6    7.9  2.0  50.2 
  (0.6)  (0.4)  (0.8)  (0.5)    (0.6)  (0.4)  (0.8)  (0.5)    (0.8)    (0.4)  (0.2)  (0.8) 
Money to male’s parents  12.6  8.0  78.8  0.6    9.3  9.6  80.5  0.5    71.8    2.7  2.5  60.5 
  (0.6)  (0.5)  (0.8)  (0.1)    (0.5)  (0.6)  (0.7)  (0.1)    (0.8)    (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.9) 
Money to female’s parents  7.9  12.6  79.2  0.3    7.4  13.6  78.6  0.5    71.4    2.0  3.9  60.5 
  (0.5)  (0.6)  (0.7)  (0.1)    (0.5)  (0.6)  (0.8)  (0.1)    (0.8)    (0.3)  (0.4)  (0.9) 
Gifts (e.g., weddings)  8.2  22.4  67.9  1.5    6.2  25.3  66.7  1.8    65.4    1.7  11.0  51.9 
  (0.4)  (0.7)  (0.8)  (0.2)    (0.4)  (0.7)  (0.8)  (0.2)    (0.8)    (0.2)  (0.5)  (0.8) 
Arisan (savings club)  10.1  36.4  51.8  1.7    7.0  43.9  47.2  1.9    73.8    1.9  21.4  30.9 
  (0.7)  (1.1)  (1.1)  (0.3)    (0.6)  (1.1)  (1.1)  (0.3)    (0.7)    (0.3)  (0.9)  (1.0) 
Savings  17.7  17.8  61.0  3.5    12.2  24.8  59.4  3.6    77.8    4.8  6.4  34.6 
  (1.0)  (1.0)  (1.3)  (0.5)    (0.9)  (1.1)  (1.3)  (0.5)    (0.7)    (0.6)  (0.6)  (1.3) 
Male time->social  49.1  4.6  46.1  0.2    44.6  9.1  45.9  0.4    61.9    29.7  0.8  31.2 
  (0.8)  (0.3)  (0.8)  (0.1)    (0.8)  (0.5)  (0.8)  (0.1)    (0.8)    (0.7)  (0.1)  (0.8) 
Female time->social  8.2  42.7  48.8  0.3    9.2  41.6  48.7  0.4    61.4    1.5  25.7  34.0 
  (0.4)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.1)    (0.5)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.1)    (0.8)    (0.2)  (0.7)  (0.8) 
Time spent working  26.8  3.9  68.2  1.1    22.9  8.2  68.0  0.8    69.6    12.8  1.2  55.1 
  (0.7)  (0.3)  (0.8)  (0.2)    (0.7)  (0.4)  (0.8)  (0.1)    (0.7)    (0.5)  (0.2)  (0.8) 
Use contraception  5.8  17.9  76.0  0.3    5.5  18.2  75.8  0.5    78.6    1.0  7.4  58.8 
  (0.5)  (0.8)  (0.9)  (0.1)    (0.5)  (0.8)  (0.9)  (0.1)    (0.7)    (0.2)  (0.5)  (1.0) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5a—Determinants of reported decisionmakers regarding expenditures on 
food at home 
 
                Male's report                             Female's report             
  Decisionmaker is  Male  Female  Female  Male  Female  Female 
     relative to  relative to    relative to  relative to 
Covariates    joint  male    joint  male 
 
Ethnicity: (1) if 
  Javanese  -0.622*  -0.316+  0.306  -0.064  -0.357+  -0.292 
   (2.20)  (1.66)  (1.33)  (0.21)  (1.87)  (1.12) 
  Sumatran  -0.517  -1.016*  -0.499+  -0.344  -0.950*  -0.605+ 
   (1.57)  (4.62)  (1.81)  (0.93)  (4.29)  (1.89) 
  Minangkabau  -0.701+  -1.721*  -1.019*  -1.374*  -1.717*  -0.343 
   (1.90)  (6.96)  (3.12)  (2.76)  (7.07)  (0.74) 
  Balinese  -2.399*  -1.031*  1.368*  -1.717*  -1.211*  0.505 
   (4.09)  (4.31)  (2.47)  (3.27)  (5.11)  (1.03) 
  Outer islands  -0.448  -0.073  0.376  0.420  -0.016  -0.436 
   (1.26)  (0.32)  (1.27)  (1.15)  (0.07)  (1.44) 
(1) urban household  0.209  0.137  -0.071  0.364*  0.062  -0.302+ 
   (1.19)  (1.34)  (0.46)  (2.06)  (0.60)  (1.94) 
Years of education 
  Male  0.022  0.003  -0.018  0.004  -0.002  -0.006 
   (0.80)  (0.18)  (0.78)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.25) 
  Female  -0.034  -0.014  0.020  -0.067*  -0.000  0.067* 
   (1.16)  (0.82)  (0.76)  (2.18)  (0.05)  (2.41) 
Age 
  Male  0.010  -0.010  -0.020+  -0.011  -0.015*  -0.003 
   (0.80)  (1.39)  (1.86)  (0.92)  (2.10)  (0.33) 
  Female  -0.023+  0.003  0.027*  -0.011  0.001  0.012 
   (1.71)  (0.38)  (2.18)  (0.79)  (0.11)  (0.96) 
(1) male is head  1.107*  0.824*  -0.282  1.146*  1.021*  -0.125 
   (2.83)  (4.86)  (0.75)  (3.08)  (6.10)  (0.35) 
(1) if male's family higher social status 
  According to male  0.028  -0.241+  -0.269  0.083  -0.014  -0.096 
   (0.13)  (1.81)  (1.38)  (0.35)  (0.10)  (0.47) 
  According to female  -0.338  0.301+  0.639*  -0.091  0.103  0.195 
   (1.07)  (1.85)  (2.23)  (0.32)  (0.66)  (0.76) 
Interview characteristics 
  (1) spouse at male interview  0.167  0.226+  0.059  0.149  0.421*  0.272 
   (0.82)  (1.93)  (0.32)  (0.75)  (3.65)  (1.54) 
  (1) spouse at female interview  -0.101  0.102  0.203  -0.056  0.066  0.123 
   (0.55)  (0.92)  (1.26)  (0.30)  (0.59)  (0.74) 
  (1) male interview alone  0.274  0.117  -0.156  -0.028  0.344*  0.373+ 
   (1.14)  (0.85)  (0.73)  (0.12)  (2.53)  (1.69) 
  (1) female interview alone  -0.357  0.160  0.517*  -0.069  -0.030  0.039 
   (1.48)  (1.22)  (2.38)  (0.30)  (0.24)  (0.19) 
Intercept  -0.949  1.408*  2.358*  -0.686  1.502*  2.189* 
   (1.59)  (4.28)  (4.35)  (1.15)  (4.58)  (4.06) 
Likelihood     -2,333.198        -2,323.241    
Chi square     199.600        212.940    
 
Notes: Mulitinomial logit regression estimates. Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.   37
Table 5b—Determinants of reported decisionmakers regarding expenditures on 
child education 
 
                 Male's report                              Female's report             
  Decisionmaker is  Male  Female  Female  Male  Female  Female 
     relative to  relative to    relative to  relative to 
Covariates    joint  male    joint  male 
 
Ethnicity: (1) if 
  Javanese  -0.661*  -0.644*  0.017  -0.315+  -0.449*  -0.133 
   (4.13)  (3.86)  (0.08)  (1.73)  (2.85)  (0.62) 
  Sumatran  -1.087*  -0.767*  0.320  -0.795*  -0.913*  -0.118 
   (4.51)  (3.33)  (1.04)  (3.01)  (3.94)  (0.36) 
  Minangkabau  -1.242*  -2.444*  -1.202*  -1.942*  -1.334*  0.608 
   (3.79)  (4.60)  (1.99)  (3.62)  (3.84)  (0.98) 
  Balinese  -0.861*  -0.944*  -0.083  -0.317  -2.533*  -2.215* 
   (3.44)  (3.45)  (0.25)  (1.21)  (5.29)  (4.21) 
  Outer islands  -0.458*  -0.514*  -0.056  -0.582*  -0.464*  0.118 
   (2.29)  (2.41)  (0.22)  (2.42)  (2.33)  (0.42) 
(1) urban household  0.069  0.083  0.015  0.092  0.182  0.091 
   (0.60)  (0.69)  (0.10)  (0.72)  (1.59)  (0.57) 
Years of education 
  Male  0.030+  -0.071*  -0.101*  0.024  -0.031+  -0.055* 
   (1.69)  (3.79)  (4.27)  (1.25)  (1.77)  (2.28) 
  Female  -0.073*  0.036+  0.110*  -0.061*  -0.018  0.043 
   (3.75)  (1.72)  (4.16)  (2.79)  (0.93)  (1.57) 
Age 
  Male  0.013  0.012  -0.001  -0.002  0.012  0.014 
   (1.55)  (1.29)  (0.13)  (0.24)  (1.40)  (1.19) 
  Female  -0.018*  -0.024*  -0.006  -0.004  -0.025*  -0.020 
   (1.98)  (2.49)  (0.52)  (0.43)  (2.72)  (1.58) 
  (1) male is head  -0.306  0.707*  1.013*  -0.029  0.099  0.128 
   (1.48)  (2.27)  (2.90)  (0.12)  (0.42)  (0.41) 
(1) if male's family higher social status 
  According to male  0.084  -0.069  -0.154  0.043  -0.049  -0.092 
   (0.59)  (0.44)  (0.79)  (0.27)  (0.33)  (0.45) 
  According to female  -0.056  -0.286+  -0.229  -0.282  -0.431*  -0.148 
   (0.33)  (1.74)  (1.07)  (1.57)  (2.79)  (0.69) 
Interview characteristics 
  (1) spouse at male interview  -0.184  0.176  0.360+  0.006  -0.113  -0.119 
   (1.39)  (1.19)  (1.97)  (0.04)  (0.85)  (0.64) 
  (1) spouse at female interview  -0.067  -0.147  -0.080  -0.178  0.118  0.296+ 
   (0.55)  (1.15)  (0.50)  (1.31)  (0.96)  (1.75) 
  (1) male interview alone  0.182  0.334+  0.152  -0.032  -0.072  -0.039 
   (1.20)  (1.96)  (0.73)  (0.19)  (0.45)  (0.18) 
  (1) female interview alone  0.007  0.147  0.141  -0.033  0.168  0.201 
   (0.04)  (0.99)  (0.74)  (0.21)  (1.12)  (1.00) 
Intercept  -0.333  -0.994*  -0.660  -0.775+  -0.164  0.611 
   (0.88)  (2.20)  (1.22)  (1.81)  (0.43)  (1.16) 
Likelihood     -2,483.389        -2,375.682    
Chi square     147.420        137.520    
 
Notes: Sample contains 3,357 couples. Mulitinomial logit regression estimates. Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.   38
Table 5c—Determinants of reported decisionmakers regarding use of health care 
for children  
 
                Male's report                             Female's report             
  Decisionmaker is  Male  Female  Female  Male  Female  Female 
     relative to  relative to    relative to  relative to 
Covariates    joint  male    joint  male 
 
Ethnicity: (1) if 
  Javanese  -0.699*  -0.581*  0.118  -0.380+  -0.576*  -0.195 
   (4.09)  (3.78)  (0.58)  (1.80)  (4.11)  (0.85) 
  Sumatran  -1.226*  -0.901*  0.325  -1.122*  -1.213*  -0.090 
   (4.55)  (4.11)  (1.01)  (3.42)  (5.61)  (0.25) 
  Minangkabau  -1.510*  -1.890*  -0.379  -2.001*  -2.015*  -0.014 
   (3.80)  (4.83)  (0.71)  (3.24)  (5.21)  (0.02) 
  Balinese  -1.410*  -0.952*  0.459  -1.262*  -2.664*  -1.402* 
   (4.34)  (3.79)  (1.20)  (3.26)  (6.51)  (2.58) 
  Outer islands  -0.511*  -0.538*  -0.026  -0.549*  -0.628*  -0.078 
   (2.40)  (2.74)  (0.10)  (2.01)  (3.49)  (0.26) 
(1) Urban household  0.263*  0.238*  -0.025  0.066  0.387*  0.321+ 
   (2.06)  (2.17)  (0.16)  (0.43)  (3.70)  (1.86) 
Years of education 
  Male  -0.000  -0.046*  -0.046+  -0.000  -0.015  -0.015 
   (0.01)  (2.71)  (1.93)  (0.00)  (0.98)  (0.60) 
  Female  -0.041+  0.015  0.057*  -0.024  -0.045*  -0.021 
   (1.91)  (0.79)  (2.13)  (0.92)  (2.51)  (0.73) 
Age 
  Male  0.012  0.009  -0.002  -0.002  0.015*  0.018 
   (1.25)  (1.12)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (2.01)  (1.37) 
  Female  -0.018+  -0.026*  -0.007  -0.002  -0.029*  -0.026+ 
   (1.79)  (2.87)  (0.62)  (0.20)  (3.47)  (1.89) 
  (1) male is head  -0.109  0.241  0.350  -0.010  0.096  0.106 
   (0.45)  (1.04)  (1.13)  (0.04)  (0.45)  (0.32) 
(1) if male's family higher social status 
  According to male  0.308*  -0.103  -0.412*  0.172  0.005  -0.166 
   (2.03)  (0.70)  (2.14)  (0.92)  (0.04)  (0.78) 
  According to female  0.144  0.130  -0.014  0.287  0.412*  0.125 
   (0.79)  (0.83)  (0.07)  (1.36)  (2.86)  (0.53) 
Interview characteristics 
  (1) spouse at male interview  -0.140  0.049  0.189  0.222  0.062  -0.159 
   (0.94)  (0.37)  (1.03)  (1.19)  (0.50)  (0.76) 
  (1) spouse at female interview  0.030  -0.097  -0.127  -0.027  0.048  0.075 
   (0.22)  (0.83)  (0.77)  (0.17)  (0.43)  (0.41) 
  (1) male interview alone  0.173  0.206  0.033  0.261  0.005  -0.255 
   (1.00)  (1.36)  (0.16)  (1.21)  (0.03)  (1.05) 
  (1) female interview alone  -0.077  0.140  0.217  0.005  0.200  0.194 
   (0.47)  (1.03)  (1.10)  (0.03)  (1.48)  (0.88) 
Intercept  -0.894*  -0.539  0.355  -1.750*  -0.399  1.351* 
   (2.27)  (1.51)  (0.73)  (3.69)  (1.22)  (2.53) 
Likelihood     -2,474.230        -2,325.791    
Chi square     140.180        201.510    
 
Notes: Sample contains 3,443 couples. Mulitinomial logit regression estimates. Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.   39
Table 5d—Determinants of reported decisionmakers regarding expenditures on 
durables 
 
                Male's report                             Female's report             
  Decisionmaker is  Male  Female  Female  Male  Female  Female 
     relative to  relative to    relative to  relative to 
Covariates    joint  male    joint  male 
 
Ethnicity: (1) if 
  Javanese  -0.706*  -0.727*  -0.020  -0.763*  -0.888*  -0.125 
   (5.01)  (3.57)  (0.09)  (5.30)  (4.74)  (0.60) 
  Sumatran  -0.335+  -1.121*  -0.786*  -0.473*  -1.671*  -1.197* 
   (1.86)  (3.40)  (2.23)  (2.53)  (4.91)  (3.28) 
  Minangkabau  -1.010*  -1.489*  -0.478  -1.631*  -2.015*  -0.383 
   (3.81)  (3.25)  (0.95)  (4.96)  (4.13)  (0.68) 
  Balinese  -0.458*  -1.098*  -0.640+  -0.190  -3.871*  -3.680* 
   (2.20)  (3.05)  (1.65)  (0.94)  (3.79)  (3.57) 
  Outer islands  -0.908*  -0.434+  0.475  -0.771*  -1.282*  -0.511+ 
   (4.81)  (1.71)  (1.64)  (4.17)  (4.67)  (1.67) 
  (1) Urban household  -0.009  0.322*  0.331+  0.081  0.084  0.004 
   (0.10)  (2.10)  (1.94)  (0.80)  (0.55)  (0.02) 
Years of education 
  Male  0.011  -0.018  -0.029  0.011  0.006  -0.005 
   (0.73)  (0.77)  (1.11)  (0.71)  (0.24)  (0.20) 
  Female  -0.050*  0.001  0.052+  -0.057*  -0.027  0.029 
   (2.99)  (0.05)  (1.77)  (3.30)  (1.08)  (1.01) 
Age 
  Male  -0.004  0.005  0.009  -0.007  0.001  0.008 
   (0.57)  (0.41)  (0.70)  (0.96)  (0.07)  (0.65) 
  Female  -0.008  0.005  0.013  -0.007  0.013  0.020 
   (1.05)  (0.40)  (0.98)  (0.87)  (1.14)  (1.53) 
  (1) Male is head  -0.009  0.309  0.318  -0.135  -0.321  -0.186 
   (0.05)  (0.91)  (0.87)  (0.71)  (1.18)  (0.60) 
(1) If male's family higher social status 
  According to male  0.359*  -0.025  -0.383+  0.213+  -0.224  -0.437+ 
   (2.96)  (0.12)  (1.72)  (1.70)  (1.06)  (1.90) 
  According to female  -0.127  -0.118  0.010  -0.050  -0.509*  -0.459* 
   (0.90)  (0.54)  (0.04)  (0.34)  (2.63)  (2.04) 
Interview characteristics 
  (1) Spouse at male interview  -0.060  -0.261  -0.200  -0.000  0.058  0.058 
   (0.53)  (1.45)  (1.00)  (0.01)  (0.31)  (0.29) 
  (1) Spouse at female interview  -0.112  -0.081  0.031  0.037  0.108  0.071 
   (1.07)  (0.49)  (0.17)  (0.34)  (0.66)  (0.39) 
  (1) Male interview alone  -0.024  0.218  0.243  0.086  0.288  0.202 
   (0.18)  (1.11)  (1.09)  (0.63)  (1.37)  (0.86) 
  (1) Female interview alone  0.037  0.169  0.132  -0.007  0.160  0.168 
   (0.30)  (0.90)  (0.63)  (0.06)  (0.83)  (0.77) 
Intercept  0.132  -2.327*  -2.459*  0.155  -1.344*  -1.499* 
   (0.40)  (4.29)  (4.14)  (0.46)  (2.79)  (2.77) 
Likelihood     -2,478.854        -2,429.908 
Chi square     119.190        178.710 
 
Notes: Sample contains 3,520 couples. Mulitinomial logit regression estimates. Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.   40
Table 5e—Determinants of reported decisionmakers regarding use of contraceptives 
 
                Male's report                             Female's report             
  Decisionmaker is  Male  Female  Female  Male  Female  Female 
     relative to  relative to    relative to  relative to 
Covariates    joint  male    joint  male 
 
Ethnicity: (1) if 
  Javanese  -1.212*  -0.503*  0.709*  -0.518+  -0.391*  0.127 
   [4.44]  [2.77]  [2.35]  [1.84]  [2.24]  [0.41] 
  Sumatran  -0.319  -0.037  0.282  -0.036  -0.380  -0.344 
   [0.95]  [0.16]  [0.75]  [0.10]  [1.55]  [0.85] 
  Minangkabau  -1.258*  0.086  1.345*  -2.173*  0.141  2.314* 
   [2.20]  [0.30]  [2.22]  [2.09]  [0.52]  [2.19] 
  Balinese  -2.461*  -0.681*  1.781*  -3.124*  -1.243*  1.881+ 
   [3.83]  [2.48]  [2.63]  [3.00]  [4.08]  [1.76] 
  Outer islands  -0.818*  -1.077*  -0.259  -0.006  -0.813*  -0.807* 
   [2.35]  [3.93]  [0.63]  [0.02]  [3.12]  [2.01] 
  (1) Urban household  -0.312  0.102  0.414+  0.309  0.109  -0.199 
   [1.46]  [0.81]  [1.76]  [1.43]  [0.87]  [0.85] 
Years of education 
  Male  -0.035  -0.019  0.016  0.004  -0.016  -0.020 
   [1.14]  [1.05]  [0.46]  [0.13]  [0.85]  [0.58] 
  Female  -0.021  -0.020  0.001  -0.067+  -0.056*  0.011 
   [0.61]  [0.97]  [0.02]  [1.86]  [2.66]  [0.27] 
Age 
  Male  0.013  0.013  0.000  -0.017  0.012  0.029 
   [0.79]  [1.27]  [0.02]  [0.91]  [1.22]  [1.45] 
  Female  -0.009  -0.021+  -0.012  -0.009  -0.029*  -0.020 
   [0.50]  [1.82]  [0.60]  [0.46]  [2.55]  [0.88] 
  (1) Male is head  -0.592+  0.191  0.784*  0.432  0.130  -0.302 
   [1.86]  [0.75]  [2.07]  [0.96]  [0.54]  [0.62] 
(1) if male's family higher social status 
  According to male  0.543*  0.197  -0.345  0.369  0.294+  -0.074 
   [2.33]  [1.27]  [1.33]  [1.52]  [1.94]  [0.28] 
  According to female  -0.215  0.298+  0.513  0.421  0.595*  0.174 
   [0.67]  [1.80]  [1.49]  [1.50]  [3.67]  [0.58] 
Interview characteristics 
  (1) spouse at male interview  -0.365  0.243  0.609*  -0.369  0.175  0.544* 
   [1.62]  [1.56]  [2.36]  [1.51]  [1.17]  [2.02] 
  (1) spouse at female interview  -0.410+  -0.033  0.377  -0.216  -0.226+  -0.009 
   [1.87]  [0.25]  [1.55]  [0.94]  [1.68]  [0.04] 
  (1) male interview alone  -0.274  0.287  0.561+  -0.009  0.041  0.050 
   [0.98]  [1.60]  [1.79]  [0.03]  [0.23]  [0.16] 
  (1) female interview alone  -0.371  -0.138  0.233  0.070  0.009  -0.061 
   [1.39]  [0.87]  [0.79]  [0.27]  [0.06]  [0.22] 
Intercept  -0.399  -0.984*  -0.585  -1.125+  -0.298  0.828 
   [0.69]  [2.41]  [0.88]  [1.66]  [0.76]  [1.12] 
Likelihood     -1,458.496        -1,435.542 
Chi square     96.490        117.130 
 
Notes: Sample contains 2,211 couples. Mulitinomial logit regression estimates. Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.   41
Table 6—Joint tests of significance: F test statistics (p values in parentheses) 
  Food  Education  Health  Durable  Contraception 
           
Social status of husband and wife  12.50  4.50  5.95  10.43  9.83 
  (0.01)  (0.34)  (0.20)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
           
Education of husband and wife  1.77  31.54  14.63  13.94  8.16 
  (0.77)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.86) 
           
Ethnicity of couple  128.40  54.84  66.15  56.91  55.92 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
  
APPENDIX 
SECTION PK (HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING) 
(Source: Rand Corporation 1998) 
 




  SECTION 
  PK09.  About what percent did your spouse 
keep? 
 
~~~ % .............................1   —>PK11 
DON’T KNOW ........................8 
PK00b.  Does your spouse live in this 





  SECTION 
  PK10.  Try to estimate the percentage that 
your spouse kept. 
Only (less than 10%) ...............................1 
Some (approximately 25%).......................2 
Approximately half...................................3 
More than half ........................................4 
PK01.  Do you yourself receive money from 
working inside or outside the 
household, or from some other regular 






  PK12.  INTERVIEWER CHECK: PK01, PK07 
DO THE RESPONDENT AND 
SPOUSE BOTH RECEIVE MONEY? 
Yes.......................................1 
No........................................3   —>PK14 
PK02.  Are you free to spend this money for 
household expenses? 
Yes, all HH expenses...............1 
Yes, some HH expenses..........2 
Yes, daily expenses.................3 
No........................................5 
    PK13.  How regular is the money you receive 
in comparison to the money y our 
spouse receives? 
Much less regular....................................1 
A little less regular...................................2 
About the same .......................................3 
A little more regular .................................4 
Much more regular ..................................5 
PK03.  Apart from money you spend for 
household expenses, is there any part 
of your income that you set aside 
which you can spend without 





  PK14.  If you needed money and your spouse 
was not at home, would you feel 




Spouse never has money .........................6 
Refuse to answer....................................7 
PK04.  From this money, how much did you 




DON’T KNOW ........................8 
 
—> PK07 
  PK15.  If you need money and your spouse is 
not at home, do you ever take money 





PK05.  About what percent did you keep? 
 
~~~.................................1 
DON’T KNOW ........................8 
 
—> PK07 
  PK15a.  If you needed money and your spouse 
were not at home, would he/she feel 




PK06.  Try to estimate the percentage that 
you kept. 
Only a little (less than 10%) ......1 
Some (approximately 25%).......2 
About half ..............................3 
More than half ........................4 
    PK16.  If your spouse needed money and you 
were not at home, would you feel 
comfortable if your spouse took 
money from your purse/wallet? 
Yes.......................................................1 
No........................................................3 
PK07.  Does your spouse receive money from 
working inside or outside the 
household or from some other regular 
source? (Do not include money you 





  PK17.  If your spouse needs money and you 
are not at home, has your spouse ever 





PK07a.  Is your spouse free to spend some of 
that money for household expenses? 
Yes, all HH expenses...............1 
Yes, some HH expenses..........2 
Yes, daily expenses.................3 
No........................................5 
    PK17a.  If your spouse needed money and you 
were not at home, would you feel 




PK07b.  Apart from the money your spouse 
spends for household expenses, is 
there any part of your spouse’s 
income that your spouse sets aside 






       
PK08.  From this money, how much did your 




DON’T KNOW ........................8 
 
—> PK12 
        
SECTION PK (HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING) 
We would like to know how  your family makes decisions about expenditures and use of time. 
  PK18 
  In your household, who makes decisions about: 
(CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY ON EACH LINE) 













































































































































































A.  Food eaten at home.......................................................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P    Z 
B.  Routine Purchases for the household of items such as cleaning supplies ...........................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P    Z 
C.  Your clothes.....................................................................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P    Z 
D.  Your spouse’s clothes....................................................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P    Z 
E.  Your children’s clothes ..................................................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P  W  Z 
F.  Your children’s education..............................................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P  W  Z 
G.  Your children’s health ....................................................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P  W  Z 
H.  Large expensive purchases for the household (i.e., refrigerator or TV) ................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P    Z 
I.  Giving money to your parents/family...........................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P  X  Z 
J.  Giving money to your spouse’s parents/family..........................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P  X  Z 
K.  Gifts for parties/weddings..............................................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P    Z 
L.  Money for monthly arisan (savings lottery) ................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P  X  Z 
M.  Money for monthly savings...........................................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P  X  Z 
N.  Time the husband spends socializing .........................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P    Z 
O.  Time the wife spends socializing .................................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P    Z 
P.  Whether you/your spouse works?...............................................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P  V  Z 
Q.  Whether you and your spouse use contraception?..................................................................  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N.......................   O  P  Y  Z 
                                   
 
Code PK18: 
V. Don’t work  W. No children 
X. Never used money for this purpose  Y. Never used contraception 
    
SECTION PK (HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING) 
  PK20  PK21TYPE  PK21 
 
At that time that you were married, was […] alive?  ANSWER PK21 IF 1 IS  At the time that you were married, how 
did the status of your parents compare to the 
status of your parents-in-law? 
  PK20a.  PK20b.  PK20c.  PK20d.                     
 
Father 
1. Yes  
3.  No 
Mother 
1. Yes  
3.  No 
Father-in-
law 
1. Yes  
3.  No 
Mother-in-
law 
1. Yes  
3.  No 
CIRCLED IN BOTH COLUMNS 
                 
 
INTERVIEWER CHECK: (CIRCLE 1 (YES), 3 (NO) 
IN EACH COLUMN FOR LINES A -H. BASED ON THE 
INFORMATION IN PK20a-PK20d. 
                   
  PK20ax.  PK20bx.  PK20cx.  PK20dx.                     
  1 
3 
  1 
3 
 
A. Father’s job  Higher 










  1 
3 
  1 
3 
 
B. Father’s education  Higher 
1  2  3  4 
Lower 
5 







  1 
3 
  1 
3 
C. Mother’s education  Higher 
1  2  3  4 
Lower 
5 







CIRCLE 1 IF EITHER 
MOTHER OR FATHER WAS 
ALIVE 
CIRCLE 1 IF EITHER 
MOTHER-IN-LAW OR 
FATHER-IN-LAW WAS ALIVE 
                   




D. Position in community   Higher 
1  2  3  4 
Lower 
5 










E. Quality of house/ 
     neighborhood 
Higher 
1  2  3  4 
Lower 
5 










F. Earnings  Higher 
1  2  3  4 
Lower 
5 










G. Land  Higher 
1  2  3  4 
Lower 
5 










H. Other assets  Higher 
1  2  3  4 
Lower 
5 







  CODES FOR PK21 
  1. Much higher  4. Somewhat lower  6. Parent(s) not alive at 
  2. Somewhat higher  5. Much lower       time of marriage 
  3. About the same    7. Unwilling to answer 
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